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IS THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION ADAPTED TO
PRESENT NECESSITIES, OR MUST THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE A NEW ONE?
There have always been two rival and divirgent views of the
powers of the government under the Constitution: the first, that as
to those subjects upon which Congress may legislate at all, its
powers are exclusive; the second, that certain of its powers may
be exercised concurrently with the several states; to these may now
be added a third, that the states may pre-empt the subjects over
which their control shall be exclusive. The Constitution is appealed
to as furnishing the basis for all these theories, and it is a common
thing for advocates of each, to quote as supporting their views, the
well-known panegyric of Gladstone, who said that just "as the
British Constitution is the most subtle organism which has pro-
ceeded from progressive history, so the American Constitution is
the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the
brain and purpose of man."
The American people have lived, have been governed, have pro-
gressed and achieved great things under this marvelous document
in the one hundred and twenty years since its adoption. But we are
now facing new problems; some of them more difficult than any
which have hitherto called for solution; and if the American Con-
stitution means what some of its professed adherents insist it means,
and if it does not give the Federal Government power to deal with
existing conditions which closely affect our national life, it has
ceased to be adapted to the needs of this people, and the great Eng-
lishman would himself be probably the first to confess that our Con-
stitution, though produced by the keenest intellects and most ardent
patriots ever summoned to such a task, has finally been found want-
ing in the very particular which inspired the Federal compact.
The Confederation had proven a rope of sand; and only through
the patriotism and high purpose of Washington did the Revolution
result in victory to the ragged, tired American forces. After the
surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown the efforts to establish credit
abroad and tranquility at home were unsuccessful. Even before
the Revolutionary Army had disbanded, in a letter known as Wash-
ington's legacy to the American people, he insisted upon four things
which were essential to the existence of the United States as an
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independent power. Of these essentials, but two need be here
noticed:
The first: "An indissoluble union of all the states under a single
Federal government which must possess the power of enforcing
its decrees."
The last: "The people must be willing to sacrifice, if need be,
some of their local interests to the common weal; they must dis-
card their local prejudices and regard one another as fellow-citi-
zens of a common country with interests in the deepest and truest
sense identical."
1
The commercial and political rivalry between the states was
sharp: the civilization they severally enjoyed differed in degree:
the separation of the people was complete and their isolation so
great as to be almost beyond our comprehension. There were no
steamboats; no railroads; it took a week or ten days of uncom-
fortable and dangerous travel to go from Boston to New York, "and
as the mails were irregular and uncertain and the rates of postage
very high, people heard from one another but seldom."
'2 It was
impossible to raise a revenue to conduct a government. The states
passed different traffic and tonnage acts and began to make com-
mercial war upon one another. Connecticut and Pennsylvania
quarreled over the valley of the Wyoming, and the story of the
treatment of the unfortunate Yankees by the Pennsylvania legisla-
ture and militia is a chapter reciting the most cruel conduct ever
charged against any of the American people except our treatment of
the Indian tribes. The long and bitter dispute between New York
and New Hampshire for the possession of the Green Mountains
broke out afresh: the farmers and merchants of Rhode Island were
in a fierce controversy with each other, and Shay's Rebellion
occurred in Massachusetts. At this critical juncture, when anarchy
seemed the doom of America, Washington conceived a project to
connect the headwaters of the Potomac with the Ohio River and
inspired the agreement between the states of Maryland, Virginia
and Pennsylvania with reference to the proposed enterprise. From
this modest beginning the Constitution was evolved.3 And the
regulation of commerce was the motive for the Federal compact.,
The student of constitutional history is familiar with subsequent
events which resulted in the adoption of the Constitution. The
i. Fiske: Critical Period of American History, 64.
2. Id. 73.
3. Fiske: The Critical Period of American History, 251; Kasson: Evolu-
tion of the United States Constitution, 40.
4. Kasson: Evolution of the United States Constitution, 138.
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plan of the Federal Union, as proposed by the delegates from Vir-
ginia, which practically obliterated state lines and obliterated state
rights, was substantially adopted except as modified by giving to the
several states equal representation in the Senate. But it is not to be
forgotten that even then there were men of undoubted patriotism,
as they understood patriotism, in and out bf the Constitutional
Convention who bitterly opposed it, chiefly b~ause it meant the
surrender of divers powers which had always theretofore been
exercised by the states.
James Wilson sought to have his associates take a larger view
of the work in which they were engaged than the mere protection
of local and transient interests. He said:
We should consider that we are providing a Constitution for future
generations and not merely for the peculiar circumstances of the moment!
Again he said:
I am lost in the magnitude of the object. We are laying the foundation
of a building in which millions are interested, and which is to last for ages.
* . * A citizen of America is a citizen of the general government
and citizen of the particular state in which he may reside. The
general government is meant for them in the first capacity; the state
government in the second. . . . The general government is not an
assemblage of states, but of individuals, for certain political purposes.
It is not meant for the states, but for the individuals composing them. The
individuals, therefore, not the states, ought to be represented in it.'
The Constitution was passed upon three compromises: The first,
already referred to, was the concession of equal representation of
the states in the Senate and the establishment of a national system
of representation in the lower House. The second, which gave dis-
proportionate weight to the slave states, gained their support. The
third, the postponement for twenty years of the abolition of the
foreign slave trade, secured absolute free trade between the states,
with the surrender of all control over commerce into the hands of
the Federal Government. 7
This concession of absolute power to Congress over commerce
so disgusted and enraged Randolph and Mason that they refused
to sign the Constitution, and Mason remained its violent opponent.
8
A letter drafted by the Convention to accompany the Constitu-
tion contained this statement:
5. Vol. III, Documentary History of the Constitution of the United
States of America, 44o.
6. Kasson, 82.
7. Fiske: The Critical Period of American History, 317.
8. Id. 314, 403.
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It is obviously impracticable, in the Federal government of these States,
to secure all rights of independent sovereignty to each, and yet provide for
the interest and safety of all. Individuals entering into society must give
up a share of liberty to preserve the rest.
The student of 'history will discover that the great-grandfathers
of the present generation were past-masters of invective and vitu-
peration, and it is apparent that the 'anti-Federalists of this day
have borrowed some of the phrases and arguments of their great-
grandfathers. But the Constitution was 'adopted and has been the
foundation upon which the Federal Government -has rested for one
hundred and twenty years, in spite of the arguments urged against
its adoption one hundred and twenty years ago, and which are now
repeated in opposition to its adaptation to present conditions, as
though these arguments were recent discoveries. The campaign
for the Constitution was a calm, dispassionate appeal to patriotic
reason, on the part of Washington, Hamilton, Madison, Wilson and
other immortals who advocated its adoption, as against the abuse
and violence of its opponents, which is copied in these days by some
who boldly charge that the views of those who believe in a con-
struction of the powers of the Federal Government under the Con-
stitution and an exercise thereof, which shall permit it to fulfill its
legitimate function, are unpatriotic if not treasonable. The ques-
tion in the concrete involves the original controversy between the
states and a central government and the surrender of the power of
the states to the Federal Government in the interest of the common
weal.
It was Madison who said:
The public good, the real welfare of the great body of the people, is the
supreme object to be pursued. . . . No form of government, whatever,
has any other value than as it may be fitted for the attainment of this object.
Were the plan of the Convention adverse to the public happiness, my voice
would be: Reject the plan. Were the Union itself inconsistent with the
public happiness, it would be: Abolish the Union. In like manner, as far as
the sovereignty of the states cannot be reconciled to the happiness of the
people, the voice of every good citizen must be: Let the former be sacri-
ficed to the latter.Y
Wilson, in the- early days of the Convention, made this state-
ment:
On examination it-would be found that the opposition to Federal meas-
tires had proceeded much more from the officers of the states than from the
people at large.2'
9. Kasson, 197.
io. The Federalist, No. 45.
ii. Vol. III, Documentary History of the Constitution, 28.
3So
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Later he said:
He did not see the danger of the states being devoured by the National
Government. On the contrary, he wished to keep them from devouring the
National Government.'
Again he said:
He conceived that, in spite of every precaution, the General Government
would be in perpetual danger of encroachments from the State Governments.
In this Madison agreed, and expressed the opinion "that there
was (i) less danger of encroachment from the General Government
than from the State Governments. (2) That the mischief from
encroachments would be less fatal if made by the former than if
made by the latter.""'
It had for years been the vocation of those who framed the Fed-
eral Constitution "to make old laws conform to the changed con-
ditions of life in the new world:'
The problem which we face at the present time is, whether or
not the inspiration and vision of the fathers was broad enough to
cover the conditions which have since developed in our national
life. Military and naval power, a stable currency, the ability to
pay debts, standing among the nations: all these we possess; and
the Constitution admittedly confers powers in these respects which,
in their legitimate exercise, serve us as well to-day as when the Con-
stitution was adopted; but the commerce and general welfare clauses
of the Constitution are in issue as much to-day as they ever were.
They involve political as well as legal questions which are broader
than mere criticisms of any particular administration.
But there is much confused thinking about these questions and
much of the present discussion does not separate the political from
the legal; or, in other words, the powers given by the Constitution
are confounded with their exercise: the undoubted prerogative of
Congress is mixed up in current thought and speech by those who
ought to know better, with the assumption that the Supreme Court
is to settle, not only what powers Congress has, but to what subjects
these powers may be applied, and how the application shall be made.
The Supreme Court has always disclaimed any such right. Just
now it is the fashion for critics of the administration to inveigh
12. Vol. III, Documentary History of the Constitution of the United
States of America, 84.
13. Id. i79.
14. Id. s7g.
x5. President Rogers in Introduction to Ann Arbor Lectures on the His-
tory of American Constitutional Law.
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against an assumed invasion of the rights of the people under their
Constitution, through what are asserted to be unwarrantable exten-
sions of Federal power. It is beyond the purpose of the writer
to discuss either the criticisms of the administration or the vexed
question of executive prerogative; but it is insisted that "the ques-
tion up before the country now is not a question of the existence of
power in the Federal Government, but only a question of the right
and just use of its acknowledged powers. These two widely differ-
ent things always have been confounded." 16 This question is not a
legal question; it involves no constitutional "amendment by inter-
pretation ;" and the dangers which frighten those who oppose the
tendency, aye, the intention, of the American people by legislation
through Congress to assume exclusive control of the instrumentali-
ties of interstate commerce are founded on local bias and have no
existence save in the imagination. But the objection to this unmis-
takable and irresistible tendency and purpose lies deeper: it rests on
a resurrected claim of the rights of the states as against the Fed-
eral Government; and when the people learn, as they rapidly are
learning, the real drift of things, they will decide the present issues
as they have all such others that have aroused political discussion
for the last hundred years, in favor of that government which rep-
resents the people and not the states; for the people have a judg-
ment which, as Mr. Justice Brewer says, "is the result of delib-
erate, well-considered thought.' 1 7 In reaching their judgments,
they are guided by the experience and wisdom which submits all
questions to the pragmatic test. In our national experience, the
attempted regulation by the states in many, if not all, matters that
concern the people as a whole has not worked to the satisfaction
of the people, and what the National Government has undertaken
has worked!
It is not possible for the states to avoid the influence of local
prejudice, sectional and commercial rivalry, and other tendencies
towards disorganization and anarchy, and the people know it. That
national spirit which knows no sectionalism and no state lines is
but a sentimental mistake if the phantom of state rights is now to
be stripped of its cerements and fleshed in respectability. Fortu-
nately, this is not at present a partisan question. What a shaking
up there will be if it reaches that stage!
It is said that "politics makes strange bedfellows." That old
adage is well illustrated in the fact that the Republican governor
16. Prof. Henry Scofield: Illinois Law Review for May, 19o7, 32.
17. Two Periods in the History of the Supreme Court: An address deliv-
ered before the Virginia State Bar Association, August, i9o6.
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of a Western state, a Republican United States Senator from a
state of the Central West, the Democratic governor from one of the
Southern states, and the last two Democratic candidates for the
presidency, are all apparently agreed in denying to Congress con-
stitutional power to effectively and exclusively regulate the agencies
and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, because, forsooth, it
will take away certain rights and privileges which the states through
their officers-not through their people-have asserted, without
regard to the prerogative of Congress as fixed by the national Con-
stitution.
"The powers of Congress are indeed enumerated; but it was
intended that those powers thus enumerated should be effectual and
not nugatory. In conformity to this consistent mode of thinking
and acting, Congress has power to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution every power vested
by the Constitution in the government of the United States or in
any of its officers or departments.""'
Moreover, the fathers had a dream of empire when they laid
the foundations upon which this vast structure we call our national
government has been built. Some of them, like Washington, Mad-
ison, Hamilton and Wilson, saw dimly, it is true, but nevertheless,
with prophetic vision, the future greatness of the American gov-
ernment under a Constitution adapted to its needs; and because
they avowedly were seeking to build a government for unborn
generations, it is fair to assume that they intended the principles
they stated in the Constitution to be applied to what should actually
come to pass, even though they could not foresee present condi-
tions.
For four thousand years the march and pressure of the race
have been from the East towards the West. It did not require the
spirit of prophecy to foretell one hundred and twenty years ago that
the tides of settlement would surge with resistless energy over the
low barrier of the Alleghany Mountains, on to the unexplored wil-
derness; and the frontier was pushed steadily toward the West
beyond the Great Lakes, beyond the Mississippi and Missouri rivers,
over the distant mountain ranges and beyond them, until there is
no longer any West! The Great American Desert has been driven
from the fertile plains of Nebraska and Kansas on past the Western
slopes of the Rocky Mountains, towards the setting sun, in very
truth a vagabond on the face of the earth. George Rogers Clark,
the Moses of the Ohio Valley, saw the
Sweet fields beyond the swelling flood.
18. 2 Wilson's Works (Andrews' Ed.), 59.
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Theft came the Louisiana Purchase, the Lewis and Clark Expedi-
tion, and the Astoria settlement followed, and thereafter was accom-
plished the gradual occupancy and settlement of the whole coun-
try west of the Alleghany Mountains. Never, since the dawn of
history, were man and his opportunity so well met, and a continent
has been transformed in two generations. The center of popula-
tion in the United States has traveled westward at the average rate
of five miles per annum for more than one hundred years, and is
now in Southern Indiana.
The food of the nation is now all produced between the Wabash
River and the Rocky Mountains, and the flocks and herds grazing
over ten thousand hills and filling countless valleys from North
Dakota to Texas fulfill their destiny in the packing-houses of Chi-
cago, Omaha and Kansas City. The pony express and stage coach
have given way to the trans-continental railway lines to meet mod-
ern needs; and thus new problems have arisen; and though the
application of steam and electricity to transportation and industrial
enterprises was unknown to the fathers, they, and their handmaiden,
Insurance, are now indispensable agencies and instrumentalities of
civilization and the commercial intercourse of men. with each other,
and are the means by which commerce is carried on among the
states, even as navigation and the barter with which they were
familiar, were the vehicles of commerce when the Constitution was
adopted.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized this development.
Marshall, the great expounder of the Constitution, who, though
not a member of the Convention, took an active part in the cam-
paign for its adoption in Virginia, characterized it as "intended to
endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the
various crises of human affairs." 19
Chief Justice Waite said of the powers granted to Congress by
the commerce clause of the Constitution:
The powers thus granted are not confined to the instrumentalities of com-
merce, or the postal service known or in use when the Constitution was
adopted, but they keep pace with the progress of the country and adapt them-
selves to the new developments of time and circumstances."
Mr. Justice Miller said that the power of regulation under the
commerce clause has been applied "to a method of intercourse which
had no existence when the Constitution was framed.'2 1
ig. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 413.
20. Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U. S.
I, 9.
21. Lectures on the Constitution, 450.
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Mr. Justice Brewer more recently said:
Constitutional provisions do not change, but their operation extends
to new matters as the modes of business and the habits of life of the people
vary with each succeeding generation. The law of the common carrier is
the same to-day as when transportation on land was by coach and wagon,
and on water by canal boat and sailing-vessel, yet in its actual operation it
touches and regulates transportation by modes then unknown, the railroad
train and steamship. Just so it is with the grant to the National Govern-
ment of power over interstate commerce. The Constitution has not changed.
The power is the same. But it operates to-day upon modes of interstate
commerce unknown to the fathers, and it will operate with equal force upon
any new modes of such commerce which the future may develop. '
And Mr. Justice Brewer, in a late -address, said:
For, after all, notwithstanding the independence of judicial tribunals,
and however much at different times they may temporarily at least stay the
action of the people speaking through the executive and legislative branches
of the government, in the last analysis the court largely reflects the popular
judgment, not its hasty opinion, but that which is the result of deliberate
and well-considered thought. And yet the power of the Supreme Court in
incarnating into the constitutional life of the nation the thoughts and pur-
poses of the people, sometimes indeed going in advance of popular recogni-
tion, makes its action not only reflex, but also an indication of the develop-
ment of popular government.O
Judge Amidon voiced the same thought when he said:
What is needed to-day is not that the constitution shall be construed to
mean precisely what it meant to Marshall or to Miller, Field and Bradley,
but that it shall be applied to present conditions by the same method and in
the same spirit wherewith they applied it to the conditions of their times. In
the performance of this, their highest duty, the Federal Courts are no part
of the administration. They will not answer to its needs or its criticism.
But they are a part of the nation, and in the past have responded, and ought
always to respond to the deep, abiding organic changes in the national life.'
That profound student of the American Constitution, Mr. Bryce,
says in substance that our Constitution has developed in at least
three ways: by amendment, interpretation and usage; that the
development by usage has established rules "not inconsistent with
its express provisions, but giving them a character, effect and direc.
tion which they would not have if they stood alone."25
Again he says:
2a. In re Debs., 158 U. S. 591.
23. Two Periods in the History of the Supreme Court: address deliv-
ered at a meeting of the Virginia State Bar Association August, i9o6.
24. Address: The Nation and the Constitution, at the meeting of the
American Bar Association at Portland, Maine, August, xgo7.
25. I Bryce: American Commonwealth, 353.
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The American Constitution has necessarily changed as the nation has
changed, has changed in the spirit with which men regard it, and therefore
in its own spirit.'
The American people do not need a new Constitution. The one
we have, thanks to the wisdom of the fathers, suffices; and even the
commerce clause, without amendment either by adoption or inter-
pretation, gives to Congress ample power, not only over commerce,
but over every agency and instrumentality of commercial inter-
course among the states. American commerce is the very heart
and center of American civilization, and rapid transit, regular and
quick mail service, the telegraph and telephone, have put all the
people of the United States in touch with each other so that the
commerce of the country is necessarily mostly interstate in character,
and hence, subject to Federal regulation. And this, after all, is the
vital question. Individual liberty and the pursuit of happiness are
now assured to American citizens, and are not longer in issue, but
it is of supreme importance that our commerce shall not be bur-
dened nor impeded by state legislation, but that it shall be effectively
controlled through Congressional action.
The commerce clause gives to Congress the power "to regulate
commerce with foreign nations and among the several states and
with the Indian tribes."
Marshall thus defined commerce among the states:
The subject to which the power is next applied is to commerce "among
the several states." The word "among" means intermingled with. A thing
which is among others is intermingled with them.. Commerce among the
states cannot stop at the external boundary line of each state, but may be
introduced into the interior.'
Commerce, therefore, is of two kinds. First, the commerce
among the states; second, that commerce which is exclusively and
completely internal and "is carried on between man and man in a
state or between different parts of the same state." The word
"among" is "restricted to that commerce which concerns more
states than one." The completely internal commerce of a state is
excluded from Federal control, but all other commerce is subject
to Federal control.
28
Whether a particular development and condition of commerce is
interstate or intra-state is a question of fact. The fact ought not to
26. 1 Bryce; American Commonwealth, 389.
27. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 194.
28. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. I94, 195; County of Mobile v. Kimball,
1o2 U. S. 691; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 1o5 U. S. 46o; How-
ard v. 11l. Cent. R. R. Co., 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141.
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be difficult to determine in any case, and could never be doubtful
in any case except for the persistent political opposition to the exten-
sion of Federal control. The Supreme Court may determine the
existence or absence of power invoked by any act of Congress:
if power exists, the court may be trusted not to encroach upon the
legislative prerogative, for there is no judicial barrier between Con-
gress and the exercise of its powers.
According to Mr. Justice Miller, there are limitations even upon
the power of the Supreme Court, and the learning and the patriot-
ism of the great men who have composed it have effectually barred
invasion by the court of the legislative and executive departments
of the government. Mr. Justice Miller said:
The theory of our governments, state and national, is opposed to the
deposit of unlimited power anywhere. The executive, the legislative, and the
judicial branches of these governments are all of limited and defined powers.
The Supreme Court is not given the power to regulate com-
merce. Nor is there any division of the subjects of commerce
depending solely upon the pleasure or the judgment of the Supreme
Court, into those which are subjects of state regulation and those
which are subjects of Congressional control. The Constitution
confides the power to regulate commerce to Congress and not to
the Supreme Court.
Webster, arguing before the Supreme Court, said:
Congress, by the Constitution, is invested with certain powers, and as
to the objects, and within the scope of these powers, it is sovereign."
To the point that Congress is authorized to pass all laws neces-
sary and proper to carry into effect the powers conferred, he said:
It is not enough to say, that it does not appear that a bank was not in
the contemplation of the framers of the Constitution. It was not their inten-
tion, in these cases, to enumerate particulars. The true view of the subject
is, that if it be a fit instrument to an authorized purpose, it may be used, not
being specially prohibited. Congress is authorized to pass all laws "necessary
and proper" to carry into execution the powers conferred on it. These words,
"necessary and proper," in such an instrument, are probably to be considered
as synonymous. Necessarily, powers must here intend such powers as are
suitable and fitted to the object; such as are best and most useful in rela-
tion to the end proposed. If this be not so, and if Congress could use no
means but such as were absolutely indispensable to the existence of a granted
power, the government would hardly exist; at least, it would be wholly inad-
equate to the purposes of its formation."
The court held in that case:
29. Loan Association v. Topeka, 2o Wall. 655, 663.
3o. McCulloch v. Maryland, supra.
31. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 324.
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If a certain means to carry into effect any of the powers, expressly
given by the Constitution to the government of the Union, be an appropriate
measure, not prohibited by the Constitution, the degree of its necessity is a
question of legislative discretion, not of judicial cognizance.'
The opinion contains this language:
But where the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to effect any
of the objects intrusted to the government, to undertake here to inquire into
the degree of its necessity, would be to pass the line which circumscribes the
judicial department, and to tread on legislative ground!'
Shortly afterwards, the great chief justice said:
The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the peo-
ple. and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in
this, as in many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the
sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse.
They are the restraints on which the people must often rely solely in all
representative governments."
The same idea was thus stated by Mr. Justice White:
No instance is afforded from the foundation of the government where
an act, which was within a power conferred, was declared to be repugnant
to the Constitution, because it appeared to the judicial mind that the particular
exertion of constitutional power was either unwise or unjust.'
It is too late to challenge the power of Congress over, or the
propriety of Federal regulation of, any instrumentality of com-
merce. Time has demonstrated the correctness of Hamilton's
declaration that the danger of usurpation by the Fdderal Govern-
ment is not to be found in the nature or extent of the powers con-
fided to it, but rather, if at all, in the composition and structure of
the Federal Government itself.
36
The question, therefore, is not as to the existence or the extent
of the power, but whether the power is applicable to any given sub-
ject, whether transportation, the telegraph, insurance, or other
interstate enterprises.
Mr. Justice Johnston said:
The language which grants the power as to one description of commerce
grants it as to all."
In speaking of the power of Congress over navigation, he said
he did not regard it as a power incidental to that of regulating com-
32. McCulloch v. Maryland (quoting from syllabus).
33. Id., 423.
34. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 U. S. I, 197.
35. McCrary v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 54.
36. The Federalist, No. 31.
37. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 229.
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merce, but he said: "I consider it as the thing itself; inseparable
from it as vital motion is from vital existence."
"Commerce," said he, "in its simplest signification, means an
exchange of goods; but in the advancement of society, labor, trans-
portation, intelligence, care, and various mediums of exchange,
become commodities, and enter into commerce, the subject, the
vehicle, the agent and their various operations, become the objects
of commercial regulation. Ship-building, the carrying trade, and
protection of seamen, are such vital agents of commercial pros-
perity, that the nation which could not legislate over these subjects
would not possess power to regulate commerce."
Mr. Justice Field"8 said that the power to regulate commerce
which is vested in Congress, "embraces within its control all the
instrumentalities by which that commerce may be carried on and the
means by which it may be aided and encouraged. The subjects,
therefore, upon which the power may be exerted are of infinite
variety." And yet the astonishing claim is made with respect to
the two most common vehicles of interstate communication among
the people, viz: the railroad companies and the insurance companies,
that the states have rights of regulation which Congress must not
invade by assuming supreme control.
The latest definition of commerce is that given by Mr. Justice
Harlan in the Lottery Cases :3
Commerce among the states embraces navigation, intercourse, communi-
cation, traffic, the transit of persons, and the transmission of messages by
telegraph.
Moreover, it is Congress and not the Supreme Court to whom
the Constitution has confided the prerogative of determining what
are and what are not subjects of interstate commerce. Congress
has the exclusive power "to determine the articles which may be the
subjects of commerce," said Mr. Justice Catron in the License
Cases.
40
Mr. Justice Field observed that: "What is an article of com-
merce is determinable by the usages of the commercial world."'1
And Mr. Chief Justice Fuller said :42
We cannot hold that any articles which Congress recognizes as subjects
of interstate commerce are not such.
38. Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196.
39. i88 U. S. 321.
40. 5 How. 504, quoted by Justices Matthews and Field, in Bowman v. Rail-
way Co., 125 U. S. 465.
41. Bowman v. Railway Co., supra.
42. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 125.
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The real opposition to the exercise of Federal control over the
instrumentalities of interstate dealings, otherwise interstate com-
merce, among the people of the United States, does not rest upon
the absence of Congressional power, but rather in the disinclination
to exercise it; for, as Mr. Justice Miller said,43 one may count on
his fingers those acts of Congress which have been held unconstitu-
tional for want of constitutional power; and that disinclination,
whether founded on selfish interest in preventing Congressional
action, or a misconception of the structure and powers of govern-
ment under the Constitution, raises a political and not a legal issue.
The supremacy of Congress acting within its powers was demon-
strated by the circumstances of the Wheeling Bridge Company
Case.44 In that case, the Supreme Court declared the bridge across
the Ohio River at Wheeling to be a nuisance because it was con-
structed in such manner as to obstruct navigation. This judgment
of the Supreme Court, says Van Santvoord, 45 "was practically nul-
lified by the subsequent act of Congress declaring the Wheeling
bridge a post road of the United States."
This act, which is Chapter CXI of the Laws of 1852,46 and
which was passed after the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States, declared the bridge "across the Ohio River at Wheel-
ing . . . (and others) . . . to be lawful structures in their
present position and elevation, and shall be so held and taken to be,
anything in any law or laws of the United States to the contrary
notwithstanding." The act also required the boats navigating the
Ohio River not to interfere with the bridge as constructed, and
required'them to lower their smokestacks, so that they could pass
under the bridge without interfering with it.
Prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in Wabash, St. Louis
& Pacific R. R. Co. V. Illinois,47 decided October 25, 1886, the court
in the famous Granger Cases had apparently held that it was com-
petent for the state of Illinois to impose certain taxes which con-
stituted a burden upon interstate commerce. Congress had then
never legislated upon this subject. The Interstate Commerce Com-
mision by which the control of Congress was asserted over inter-
state cariers was created by an Act of Congress passed in 1887.48
But the majority opinion of the Supreme Court in the Wabash Rail-
road Case written by Mr. Justice Miller, concluded with these words:
43. United States v. Steffens, ioo U S. 182.
44. 13 How. 519.
45. Lives and Services of the Chief Justices, 529.
46. io Statutes at Large, 112.
47. 118 U. S. 557.
48. 3 U. S. Compiled Statutes, 1901, p. 3153.
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Of the justice or propriety of the principle which lies at the foundation
of the Illinois statute it is not the province of this court to speak. As
restricted to a transportation which begins and ends within the limits of the
state, it may be very just and equitable, and it certainly is the province of the
state legislature to determine that question. But when it is attempted
to apply to transportation through an entire series of states a principle of
this kind, and each one of the states shall attempt to establish its own rates
of transportation, its own methods to prevent discrimination in rates, or to
permit it, the deleterious influence upon the freedom of commerce among
the states and upon the transit of goods through those states cannot be
overestimated. That this species of regulation is one which must be, if estab-
lished at all, of a general and national character, and cannot be safely and
wisely remitted to local rules and local regulations, we think is clear from
what has already been said. And if it be a regulation of commerce, as we
think we have demonstrated it is, and as the Illinois court concedes it to be,
it must be of that national character, and the regulation can only appropri-
ately exist by general rules and principles, which demand that it should be
done by the Congress of the United States under the commerce clause of
the Constitution."
And the Supreme Court in that case ' went "in advance of popular
recognition" of the sovereign power of Congress to regulate a sub-
ject over which the state of Illinois had sought to exercise control,
and in effect called upon Congress to act.
But the suggestion may be made that the Supreme Court has
said that insurance is not commerce. 0 The so-called Insurance
Cases do not, however, bar Federal control of insurance; for, in
the first place with the exception of the Cravens Case, they involved
the validity of state statutes imposing terms under the police power,
upon corporations of other states, which is quite a different thing
from the exercise of Federal power by Congressional legislation.
In the Cravens Case the question was, whether a statute of Mis-
souri, providing for the non-forfeiture of a policy of life insurance
under certain conditions, fixed the rights of the parties contrary to
the provisions of the contract as written.
In the second place, all the cases of the series subsequent to Paul
v. Virginia, accept, without question, the dictum of Mr. Justice
Field, and wholly upon that dictum rests the theory that insurance
is not commerce.
In the third place, Paul v. Virginia and the succeeding cases of
that series are not binding upon either the Supreme Court or Con-
gress because the doctrine of stare decisis is inapplicable in consti-
tutional questions, and, though Mr. Justice Brewer, off the bench,
49. 118 U. S. 557.
5o. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (i868); Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Mass. io
Wall. 566 (i87o); Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648 (x894); New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U. S. 389 (1899); Nutting v. Mass., 183 U. S. 553
09o).
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expressed the opinion that insurance "is not a part of interstate com-
merce and only a matter of local law," 51 he would, as a member of
the court, probably recognize the truth and force of what he said in
the opening sentences of the very address in which he made that
statement with respect to insurance, viz: that the court has the
power-and if it has the power, it certainly has the duty-to "incar-
nate into the constitutional life of the nation the thoughts and 'beliefs
of the people" with whom insurance is, in fact, interstate commerce,
despite all theories to the contrary.
It is sometimes urged that Marshall and his associates were free
and untrammelled by precedent and that, moreover, they had the
benefit of actual knowledge of the intentions of the framers of the
Constitution, but that now the Constitution must receive a more
literal interpretation. But "the letter killeth." Moreover, though
Marshall had the advantage of participation in the discussion which
preceded the adoption of the Constitution, the court, as it is at pres-
ent constituted, is just as free and untrammelled with respect to its
judgments on constitutional law as in the days of Marshall; for, as
already stated, the court does not consider itself bound by its pre-
vious expression of opinion on constitutional questions. There is
no reason to assume that the court will not continue to accept and
assert as sound and reasonable the doctrine stated in the Debs
Case :5
The Constitution has not changed. The power is the same. But it
operates to-day upon modes of interstate commerce unknown to the fathers;
and it will operate with equal force upon any new mode of such commerce
which the future may develop.
And this is so because the Constitution states principles suscepti-
ble of wide application and not rules intended to govern only in
special cases.
Before the promulgation of the Justinian Code, there were those
who, in the language of the late James C. Carter, made "a fatish
of the doctrine of stare decisis;" and to prevent the perpetuation of
judicial error, the Justinian Code5" gave this direction to the judges
of that day:
Let no judge or arbiter suppose that he must follow decisions which
he does not believe were rightly adjudged, much less the sentences of the
most eminent prefects or other high magistrates, for if a case is not well
decided, it ought not to be extended into a fault of other judges, since judg-
ments are to be rendered not according to examples, but according to laws.
S. Address: Two Periods in the History of the Supreme Court.
52. I58 U. S. 59'.
53. Book VII, Title 45, Section I3.
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And the Supreme Court, upon great consideration, stated the
following rule in the Income Tax Cases :5
The doctrine of stare decisis is a salutary one, and is to be adhered to
on proper occasions in. respect of decisions directly upon points in issue, but
this court should not extend any decision upon a constitutional question
if it is convinced that error in principle might supervene.
On the argument of that case it was contended that certain pre-
vious decisions of the court foreclosed the matter under considera-
tion; but the following language of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall"
was quoted by the court as a conclusive answer to such contention:
It is a maxim not to be disregarded that general expressions in every
opinion are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expres-
sions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought
not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is pre-
sented for decision. The reason of this maxim is obvious. The question
actually before the court is investigated with care and considered in its full
extent. Other principles which may serve to illustrate it are considered in
their relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on all other
cases is seldom completely investigated.
The chief justice, in -his opinion in the Income Tax Cases, also
quoted the apt language of Mr. Chief Justice Taney from The Gen-
esee Chief,58 decided in 1851, in which it was held that certain waters
were within "the scope of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction as
known and understood in the United States Wfhen the Constitution
was adopted," overruling the preceding case of The Thomas Jeffer-
son.
It is the decision in the case of The Thomas Jefferson which mainly
embarrasses the court in the present inquiry. We are sensible of the great
weight to which it is entitled. But at the same time we are convinced that
if we follow it we follow an erroneous decision into which the court fell
when the great importance of the question, as it now presents itself, could
not be foreseen, and the subject did not therefore receive that deliberate con-
sideration which at this time would have been given to it by the eminent
men who presided here when that case was decided. For the decision was
made in 1825 when the commerce on the rivers of the West and on the
lakes was in its infancy and of little importance, and but little regarded
compared with that of the present day. . . . The case of The Thomas
Jefferson did not decide any question of property or lay down any rule
by which the right of property should be determined. If it had, we should
have felt ourselves bound to follow it, notwithstanding the opinion we have
expressed. For everyone would suppose that, after the decision of this
54. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429.
55. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat 264, 399.
56. 12 How. 443, 455,
57. io Wheat. 428.
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court, in a matter of that kind, he might safely enter into contracts upon the
faith that rights thus acquired would not be disturbed. In such a case
stare decisis is the safe and established rule of judicial policy and should
always be adhered to. . . But the decision referred to has no relation
to rights of property.
The language quoted is singularly appropriate, not only to the
Insurance Cases, but to any proposed adaptation of the commerce
clause to present conditions, and Mr. Chief Justice Fuller concludes
his observation with respect to the doctrine of stare decisis as fol-
lows:
Manifestly, as this court is clothed with the power and entrusted with
the duty to maintain the fundamental law of the Constitution, the discharge
of that duty requires it not to extend any decision upon a constitutional
question if it is convinced that error in principle might supervene.
No one has put the whole matter so clearly as the late James
Bradley Thayer who said:
We must disentangle views of political theory, political morals, consti-
tutional policy, and doctrines as to that convenient refuge for loose thinking
which is vaguely called the "spirit!' of the Constitution, from doctrines of
constitutional law. Very often this is not carefully and consistently done.
And so it happens, as one looks back over our history and the field of
political discussions in the past, that he seems to see the whole region
strewn with the wrecks of the Constitution,--of what people have been imag-
ining and putting forward as the Constitution. .... That instrument,
astonishingly well adapted for the purposes of a great, developing nation,
shows its wisdom mainly in the shortness and generality of its provisions,
in its silence, and its abstinence from petty limitations. As it survives fierce
controversies from age to age, it is forever silently bearing witness to the
wisdom that went into its composition, by showing itself suited to the pur-
poses of a great people under circumstances that no one of its makers could
have foreseen. Men have found, as they are finding now, when new and
unlooked-for situations have presented themselves, that they were left with
liberty to handle them. Of this quality in the Constitution people some-
times foolishly talk as if it meant that the great barriers of this instrument
have been set at naught, and may be set at naught, in great exigencies, as if
it were always ready to give way under pressure, and as if statesmen were
always standing ready to violate it when an important enough occasion arose.
What generally happens, however, on these occasions, is that the littleness
and the looseness of men's interpretation of the Constitution are revealed,
and that this great instrument shows itself wiser and more far-looking than
men had thought-u
Ralph W. Breckenridge.
58. Our New Possessions, XII, Harvard Law Review, 468.
